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In the Court of Koppelman:
Motion for Reconsideration
James M. Oleske, Jr.*
When it comes to the issue of whether laws protecting LGBTQ
people against discrimination in the commercial marketplace should
include religious exemptions, few scholars have written as extensively as Professor Andrew Koppelman. Fourteen years ago,
Koppelman began an article on the topic by posing the following
question: “Should those who have religious objections to employing
gay people or renting them housing be allowed to discriminate?”1
His answer then was yes.2 Today, Koppelman begins his latest
engagement of the topic with a similar, albeit narrower, question:
“Should religious people who conscientiously object to facilitating
same-sex weddings, and who therefore decline to provide cakes,
photography, or other services, be exempted from antidiscrimination
laws?”3 Once again, his answer is yes.4 Between 2006 and 2020,
Koppelman weighed in on the topic several additional times,
usually in a manner consistent with the aforementioned affirmative

* Professor, Lewis & Clark Law School. I am very grateful to Andy Koppelman,
Doug NeJaime, and Liz Sepper for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Response.
1. Andrew Koppelman, You Can’t Hurry Love: Why Antidiscrimination Protections for
Gay People Should Have Religious Exemptions, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 125, 125 (2006).
2. See id. at 131–35 (reasoning that so long as discrimination against gay employees
is generally prohibited, religiously motivated discrimination against gay employees will be
sufficiently rare so as to be no more problematic than discrimination against employees for
idiosyncratic reasons that are not covered by antidiscrimination law); id. at 135–36 (reasoning
that the refusal to accommodate religious landlords and service providers does not properly
account for the burden that “forced association with gay people” places on them, and
concluding that “to accommodate them where this is possible . . . is the right thing to do”).
3. Andrew Koppelman, Gay Rights, Religious Liberty, and the Misleading Racism
Analogy, 2020 BYU L. REV. 1, 1 [hereinafter Koppelman, Misleading Racism Analogy].
4. See id. at 2 (suggesting a variety of possible exemptions, including “an exemption
for very small businesses, or for religiously oriented businesses, or expressive enterprises
such as photographers,” or an exemption for “only those who post warnings about
their religious objections, so that no customer would have the personal experience of being
turned away”).
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answers.5 Notably, however, on three occasions he offered arguments
cutting in the opposite direction.
The first such occasion came in 2013, when Koppelman and four
other scholars sent a letter in opposition to proposed legislation that
would have extended religious exemptions from civil rights laws
to owners of for-profit businesses.6 “No state has provided exemptions to secular businesses, property owners, or individuals,”7 the
letter emphasized, and “allowing secular businesses to refuse service even in the discrete context of the wedding would be
unprecedented.”8 Rather than go down that road, the letter urged
legislators to preserve the “careful balance” long struck by typical
public accommodations laws:
[R]eligious organizations are generally considered exempt from
such laws so long as they do not offer services to the general
public or engage in commercial activity. Businesses in the
commercial marketplace, on the other hand, are clearly covered
and cannot discriminate simply because business owners
sincerely believe that their discrimination is justified.9

The second occasion on which Koppelman offered an argument
against extending exemptions to business owners came in 2016,

5. See Andrew Koppelman, Gay Rights, Religious Accommodations, and the Purposes of
Antidiscrimination Law, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 619, 620 (2015) [hereinafter Koppelman, Gay Rights,
Religious Accommodations] (“Businesses that serve the public, such as wedding photographers, should be exempted, but only if they are willing to bear the cost of publicly
identifying themselves as discriminatory.”); Andrew Koppelman, Douglas Laycock, Michael
Perry & Marc D. Stern, Letter Re: Religious Liberty Implications of Same-Sex Marriage (July 15,
2009), http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/files/iowaexemptionsbase1.doc (endorsing a proposal,
attributed to Professor Thomas C. Berg and other scholars, that would have extended
exemptions to small businesses); Andrew Koppelman, Douglas Laycock, Michael Perry &
Marc D. Stem, Letter Re: Religious Liberty Protections Proposed by Governor Lynch (May 22,
2009), http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/files/newhampshireexemptionslynch2.pdf (same);
Andrew Koppelman, Douglas Laycock, Michael Perry & Marc D. Stem, Letter Re: Religious
Liberty Implications of A07732 and S04401 (May 8, 2009), https://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/
files/newyorkexemptionspaterson1.doc (same).
6. See Dale Carpenter, Andrew Koppelman, William P. Marshall, Douglas NeJaime
& Ira C. Lupu, Letter Re: Religious Liberty and Marriage for Same-Sex Couples (Oct. 23, 2013),
http://blogs.chicagotribune.com/files/five-law-professors-against-changing-sb-10.pdf
[hereinafter Illinois Letter] (opposing the proposed exemption legislation Koppelman
previously supported in the 2009 Iowa, N.H., and N.Y. letters, see sources cited supra note 5).
7. Id. at 10 (bold emphasis in original changed to italics).
8. Id. at 9.
9. Id. at 4.
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when he published an article that opened with the following
prescription:
The most sensible reconciliation of the tension between religious
liberty and public accommodations law, in the recent cases
involving merchants with religious objections to same-sex
marriage, would permit business owners to present their views to
the world, but forbid them either to threaten to discriminate or to treat
any individual customer worse than others.10

The third occasion came just last year when Koppelman
published an article in which he argued that because “[a]pprehension
about probable future threats” of discrimination can have adverse
health effects, “it will not do to simply say that there are plenty of
other bakers and photographers. The harm is not ameliorated
because the injury does not invariably occur. The uncertainty is
itself a harm.” 11 In explaining why such uncertainty exists,
Koppelman detailed extensive evidence of discrimination against
LGBTQ people in the commercial marketplace and cited a study
finding that such discrimination is as prevalent as race and sex
discrimination.12 That portrayal of the landscape casts significant
doubt on a key premise Koppelman relies upon when arguing in
favor of allowing religious defenses of refusals of service: that it is
“unlikely that there will be a flood of exemption claims.”13 Indeed,
presumably influenced by the evidence he canvassed in 2019,
Koppelman now adds: “Your judgment of likelihood may reasonably differ from mine. And such slippery-slope concerns could be
a sound basis for opposing any exemptions.”14 This is a considerable

10. Andrew Koppelman, A Free Speech Response to the Gay Rights/Religious Liberty
Conflict, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 1125, 1125 (2016) (emphasis added).
11. Andrew Koppelman, This Isn’t About You: A Comment on Smith’s Pagans and
Christians in the City, 56 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 393, 402 (2019) [hereinafter Koppelman, This Isn’t
About You]. See generally LGBTQ Weddings In 2018: A Study of Same-Sex and Queer-Identified
Couples, CMTY. MKTG. INC. 37, https://www.communitymarketinginc.com/documents/
temp/CMI-LGBTQ-WeddingSurvey_2018.pdf (last visited Mar. 23, 2020) (reporting that 44
percent of surveyed same-sex couples planning a wedding were concerned about being
rejected by wedding vendors and/or government staff).
12. Koppelman, This Isn’t About You, supra note 11, at 401–03, 403 n.50.
13. Koppelman, Misleading Racism Analogy, supra note 3, at 20.
14. Id.; see Koppelman, This Isn’t About You, supra note 11, at 404 (“[Gay rights activists]
worry, on the basis of ample experience, that the conservatives cannot be trusted to leave
them alone. They resist religious accommodation because they think that the law is holding
back a tidal wave of hatred masked by religious rationalization. They fear that so many
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change in tone from 2015, when Koppelman insisted that it “makes
no rational sense to refuse to accommodate” wedding vendors who
discriminate against gay couples on religious grounds.15
In his keynote lecture for this volume, Koppelman forthrightly
confesses error for prematurely declaring victory on behalf of gay
equality in 2015.16 But his argument is still pervaded by a confidence
in the imminence of that victory that many members of the gay
community likely do not share. That confidence leads to a dubious
downplaying of the legal resistance to gay rights in the opening
paragraphs of Koppelman’s lecture17 and a closing analogy to one
of the greatest boxers of all time facing off against an opponent who
could not possibly threaten him.18 Relying on what he describes as
the “tiny number of wedding vendors” who have so far claimed a
right to refuse services to gay couples, 19 Koppelman repeatedly
people will take advantage of any exemption that the law’s protection will be nullified. It is
not an unreasonable fear. I disagree, but the question is reasonably contestable.”)
15. Koppelman, Gay Rights, Religious Accommodations, supra note 5, at 652.
16. Koppelman, Misleading Racism Analogy, supra note 3, at 21–22 (“I was wrong to
write that ‘the gay rights movement has won.’ . . . Like many gay rights advocates, I was too
focused on the then-recent marriage victory.”). See generally Kirsten Berg & Moiz Syed, Under
Trump, LGBTQ Progress Is Being Reversed in Plain Sight, PROPUBLICA (Nov. 22, 2019),
https://projects.propublica.org/graphics/lgbtq-rights-rollback (“We found dozens of
changes that represent a profound reshaping of the way the federal government treats the
more than 11 million lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender Americans.”); Tim Fitzsimons,
Nearly 1 in 5 Hate Crimes Motivated by Anti-LGBTQ Bias, FBI Finds, NBC NEWS (Nov. 12, 2019),
https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-out/nearly-1-5-hate-crimes-motivated-antilgbtq-bias-fbi-n1080891 (reporting on FBI statistics showing that reported hate crimes against
LGBTQ people rose in 2018 for the fifth straight year); Grace Hauck, Anti-LGBT Hate Crimes
Are Rising, the FBI Says. But It Gets Worse, USA TODAY (June 28, 2019), https://www.
usatoday.com/story/news/2019/06/28/anti-gay-hate-crimes-rise-fbi-says-and-theylikely-undercount/1582614001/ (observing that the FBI data “likely dramatically
underestimates the true number of hate crimes against the LGBTQ community,” and
reporting on a more comprehensive survey “suggest[ing] that a greater percentage of all hate
crimes are motivated by a bias against sexual orientation”).
17. Koppelman, Misleading Racism Analogy, supra note 3. See infra notes 19–20 and
accompanying text (quoting relevant passages).
18. Koppelman, Misleading Racism Analogy, supra note 3, at 32 (invoking Sugar Ray
Robinson).
19. Id. at 1. The allegedly “tiny number” is at least fifteen and growing, and that is
counting only those vendors who have been involved in litigation. See infra note 23
(collecting cases). There is ample reason to believe that the actual number of service refusals
is far higher. See, e.g., Dana Branham, Wedding Venue Turned Away Gay Dallas Couple, Citing
God’s ‘Design for Marriage,’ DALL. MORNING NEWS (Jan. 28, 2019, 6:12 PM), https://www.
dallasnews.com/news/2019/01/29/wedding-venue-turned-away-gay-dallas-coupleciting-god-s-design-for-marriage/; Ivey DeJesus, Star Barn Venue Bars Gay Weddings Over
Owner’s Religious Beliefs, PENNLIVE (Apr. 4, 2019), https://www.pennlive.com/business/
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portrays the stakes going forward as involving the granting of just
a “few” exemptions.20 At the same time, however, Koppelman writes
that although he is aware of only one litigated claim by a business
owner for an exemption from a race discrimination law in the 1960s,
“had it succeeded there obviously would have been others.”21
Koppelman does not explain why that same dynamic would not be
true with regard to discrimination against same-sex couples given
that (1) there are “millions of Americans today who hold conservative
views about sexuality,”22 (2) there are influential conservative
advocacy organizations working very hard to raise the profile of
the wedding-vendor cases and secure a right to refuse service,23 and
2019/04/popular-wedding-venue-bars-gay-weddings-ignites-a-social-media-storm.html;
Casey Feindt, ‘I Pray that You Choose to Repent and Serve Christ:’ Company Declines Request to
Take Photos of Same-Sex Wedding in Jacksonville, FIRST COAST NEWS (Oct. 8, 2019, 7:03 AM),
https://www.firstcoastnews.com/article/news/i-pray-that-you-choose-to-repent-andserve-christ-company-refuses-to-take-photos-of-same-sex-wedding-in-jacksonville/77ae2f8316-234c-4fa3-aa39-a65648af7845; Megan Gibson, New Jersey Bridal Shop Refuses to Sell
Wedding Gown to Lesbian Bride, TIME (Aug. 21, 2011), https://newsfeed.time.com/2011/
08/21/new-jersey-bridal-shop-refuses-to-sell-wedding-gown-to-lesbian-bride/; Erin Rook,
Nearly a Third of Lesbian Couples Are Rejected or Have Problems with Wedding Vendors, LGBTQ
NATION (Jun. 29, 2017), https://www.lgbtqnation.com/2017/06/nearly-third-lesbiancouples-rejected-problems-wedding-vendors/; Siali Siaosi, Oklahoma Directory Connects
LGBTQ Couples to Supportive Wedding Vendors, THE OKLAHOMAN (Feb. 16, 2020, 5:00 AM),
https://oklahoman.com/article/5654803/oklahoma-directory-connects-lgbtq-couples-tosupportive-wedding-vendors (“AJ Stegall, an Oklahoma City photographer, founded the
project last fall after hearing about LGBTQ couples in the state getting rejected for wedding
services. . . . ‘I started seeing more and more people being turned away and I thought, “We
need to do something about this.”’”); Rachel Zarrell, Pennsylvania Bridal Shop Refuses Lesbian
Couple Wedding Gowns, BUZZFEED (Aug. 09, 2014, 5:22 PM), https://www.buzzfeednews.
com/article/rachelzarrell/pennsylvania-bridal-shop-refuses-lesbian-couple-wedding-gown.
20. Koppelman, Misleading Racism Analogy, supra note 3, at 1, 2, 7, 22.
21. Id. at 19 n.65 (referencing Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 256 F. Supp. 941,
944 (D.S.C. 1966), rev’d, 377 F.2d 433 (4th Cir. 1967), aff’d per curiam, 390 U.S. 400 (1968)).
22. Id. at 3; see also Brooke Sopelsa, ‘Nashville Statement’: Evangelical Leaders Release
Sexuality Manifesto, NBC NEWS (Aug. 30, 2017, 9:56 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/
feature/nbc-out/nashville-statement-evangelical-leaders-release-sexuality-manifesto-n797401
(“A nationwide coalition of 153 evangelical Christian leaders released a statement Tuesday
affirming their conservative beliefs regarding human sexuality. . . . ‘We affirm that it is sinful
to approve of homosexual immorality or transgenderism and that such approval constitutes
an essential departure from Christian faithfulness and witness[.]’”).
23. See, e.g., You Are Free to Believe, but Are You Free to Act?, ALLIANCE DEFENDING
FREEDOM, https://www.adflegal.org/issues/religious-freedom/conscience (last visited
Mar. 2, 2020) (highlighting six of the wedding vendors it has represented; three additional
client vendors, Elane Photography, Amy Lynn Photography, and Chelsey Nelson Photography,
are featured elsewhere on the ADF site); Odgaard v. Iowa Civil Rights Commission, BECKET,
https://www.becketlaw.org/case/odgaard-v-iowa/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2020) (highlighting
one of the first wedding-vendor cases; Becket also has a website page featuring wedding
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(3) prominent opponents of LGBTQ rights see the exercise of such
a right as a key part of a larger strategy to resist the normalization
of same-sex marriage.24
In light of those realities, this Response urges Professor
Koppelman to reconsider his assessment of how the continuing
resistance to LGBTQ rights in America should impact our thinking
about the wedding-vendor cases.25 It also urges him to reconsider
several other questionable choices he makes in framing his
discussion of the gay-rights/religious-liberty issue. Finally, and
most importantly, it urges him to return to the position he took in
2013, maintaining that laws prohibiting sexual-orientation discrimination in places of public accommodation “reasonably adjudicate[]”
conflicting gay rights and religious liberty claims when they
provide exemptions “only for religious and religiously-affiliated
vendors that it does not represent, but on whose behalf it has filed amicus briefs); Sweet Cakes
by Melissa Case, FIRST LIBERTY, https://firstliberty.org/cases/kleins/ (last visited Mar. 2,
2020) (highlighting one of the ongoing wedding-vendor cases). For additional examples of
litigated cases, see Dep’t of Fair Emp’t & Hous. v. Cathy’s Creations, Inc., No. BCV-17-102855
(Cal. Super. Feb. 05, 2018), https://globalfreedomofexpression.columbia.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2018/02/Tastries-Ruling.pdf; Cervelli v. Aloha Bed & Breakfast, 415 P.3d 919
(Haw. Ct. App. 2018), cert. denied, 2018 WL 3358586 (Haw. July 10, 2018), cert. denied, 139 S.
Ct. 1319 (2019); Gifford v. McCarthy, 23 N.Y.S.3d 422 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016); Wathen v. Walder
Vacuflo, Inc., No. 11-0703C, at 10–11 (Ill. Human Rights Comm’n Mar. 22, 2016). See generally
Brief of Amici Curiae United States Conference of Catholic Bishops et al. in Support of
Reversal at 22, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd., v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719
(2018) (No. 16-111), 2017 WL 4131333 (supporting exemptions for wedding vendors because
“people of faith are called to live out their beliefs—including those about sex, marriage, and
the family—in every aspect of their lives, including work”).
24. See Ryan T. Anderson, Pro-Lifers Didn’t Give Up After Roe v. Wade. Here Are 3
Critical Steps to Take on Marriage, DAILY SIGNAL (June 29, 2015), https://www.dailysignal.
com/2015/06/29/pro-lifers-didnt-give-up-after-roe-v-wade-here-are-3-critical-steps-to-takeon-marriage/ (“[W]e must protect our freedom to speak and live according to our beliefs.
The pro-life movement accomplished this by ensuring that pro-life doctors and nurses would
never have to perform abortions. . . . Pro-marriage forces need to do the same: Ensure that
we have freedom from government coercion to lead our lives, rear our children, and operate
our businesses and our charities in accord with our beliefs about marriage.”) (emphasis
added). See generally, James M. Oleske, Jr., A Regrettable Invitation to “Constitutional
Resistance,” Renewed Confusion over Religious Exemptions, and the Future of Free Exercise, 20
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1317, 1321–24 (2017) (discussing more broadly the strategy advocated
by Professor Robert George for continuing to resist same-sex marriage after the Supreme
Court’s decision in Obergefell v. Hodges).
25. See generally Elizabeth Sepper, Gays in the Moralized Marketplace, 7 ALA. C.R. & C.L.
L. REV. 129, 132 (2015) (“Contrary to predictions that objections will be rare and the effects
on gay rights minimal, the moralized marketplace could instead entrench a regime of
unequal treatment for gays.”); id. at 160–69 (rebutting in considerable detail the argument
that exemptions will rarely be invoked in the commercial marketplace).
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organizations” and not for “secular businesses offering goods and
services to the public.”26
***
The two most critical choices Professor Koppelman makes in
framing his argument are to (1) focus exclusively on the weddingvendor cases, and (2) compare sexual orientation only to race and
not to any of the other protected characteristics in civil rights laws,
such as sex, religion, and marital status. Combined, these choices
lead Koppelman to paint a very incomplete picture of the overall
gay-rights/religious-liberty debate.
The consequences of Koppelman’s first choice are apparent early
on in his lecture, where he depicts the debate as follows: “Religious
liberty and nondiscrimination are each understood as moral
absolutes. Compromise is perceived as an existential threat,” and
even “[t]he most sophisticated scholars are as rigid as the
politicians and partisan commentators.”27 The truth, however, is
that almost all scholars recognize that religious liberty claims and
nondiscrimination claims both must have limits.28 Yes, there is fierce
disagreement among some scholars about how those limits play
out in one particular category of cases, but unless one reduces the
entire broader debate to those cases—and Koppelman offers no
justification for doing so—it is simply not accurate to claim that
most participants in the debate are fighting for moral absolutes.
As for policymakers, they have long accounted for the limits on
religious liberty and antidiscrimination norms by striking exactly
the “careful balance” Koppelman (and four other sophisticated
scholars) endorsed in 2013: nondiscrimination norms are limited so
as not to interfere with the internal operations of religious organizations, while religious liberty norms are limited so as not to protect
a right of for-profit businesses to discriminate in the commercial
marketplace.29 There is a more difficult category in between these
26. Illinois Letter, supra note 6, at 6 (emphasis in original).
27. Koppelman, Misleading Racism Analogy, supra note 3, at 1.
28. See, e.g., authorities cited infra note 29.
29. Illinois Letter, supra note 6, at 4; accord Brief of Amici Curiae Public Accommodation
Law Scholars in Support of Respondents at 25, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R.
Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111), 2017 WL 5127312 [hereinafter Public
Accommodation Law Scholars Brief] (“While this Court has zealously safeguarded the
internal operations of religious institutions, it has sharply distinguished between church
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two ends of the spectrum, involving religious nonprofits that participate in the commercial marketplace and provide services to the
general public,30 and that is an area where different compromises
have been struck in different states. 31 It is also an area where
compromises might be struck in the future.
To take just one example of a potential compromise, consider
the issue of tax-exempt status for religious colleges and universities.
Religious conservatives have expressed concern for years that
expanding civil rights laws to protect against sexual-orientation
discrimination will lead to an extension of the Internal Revenue
Service’s Bob Jones rule, which denies tax-exempt status to nonprofit
schools that discriminate on the basis of race.32 On the one hand,
governance and ‘commercial activities’ subject to regulation[.]”(internal citations omitted));
see also Douglas Laycock, Tax Exemptions for Racially Discriminatory Religious Schools, 60 TEX.
L. REV. 259, 263 (1982) (“[T]he internal affairs of churches are an enclave where the free
exercise clause must control; outside such enclaves, the policy against racial discrimination
controls.”); Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Same-Sex Family Equality and Religious Freedom, 5
NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 274, 282–88 (2010) (unpacking the “common intuition” that “clergy
and faith communities” cannot be required to solemnize same-sex marriages, but explaining
why a proposed religious exemption for business owners “invites skepticism and careful
scrutiny because it is legally anomalous”); Sepper, supra note 25, at 135 (referencing the
“long-stable distinctions that constitutional and statutory law has drawn between secular
for-profits and religious non-profit organizations”).
30. See Thomas C. Berg, Partly Acculturated Religious Activity: A Case for Accommodating
Religious Nonprofits, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1341, 1341 (2016) (noting that exemptions for
“religious entities that reach out to provide services to the broader public provoke much
more controversy”); Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 29, at 296 (“The third, and most difficult,
category of potential conflicts relates to a broad array of religiously affiliated organizations.”);
Robin Fretwell Wilson, Bargaining for Religious Accommodations: Same-Sex Marriage and LGBT
Rights After Hobby Lobby, in THE RISE OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 257, 263 (Micah
Schwartzman et al., eds., 2016) (“As specific exemptions move beyond private religious
spaces, the number of states willing to enact a given exemption drops off—in part because
of concerns about hardship to same-sex couples.”). See generally Bruce N. Bagni, Discrimination
in the Name of the Lord: A Critical Evaluation of Discrimination by Religious Organizations, 79
COLUM. L. REV. 1514, 1539–40 (1979) (“Once, however, the church acts outside th[e] epicenter
and moves closer to the purely secular world, it subjects itself to secular regulation
proportionate to the degree of secularity of its activities and relationships.”).
31. See Robin Fretwell Wilson & Anthony Michael Kreis, Embracing Compromise: Marriage
Equality and Religious Liberty in the Political Process, 15 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 485, 511–15 (2014)
(surveying different accommodations for religious organizations that were adopted in states
that extended marriage recognition to same-sex couples legislatively); cf. id. at 488–89
(observing that lawmakers in these states declined to extend exemptions to small
businesses). Notably, while Wilson and Kreis both support seeking compromises that
involve exemptions for nonprofits, they disagree about extending exemptions to for-profits.
See id. at 506 n.130.
32. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 577–79, 585–605 (1983)
(describing the IRS rule, finding it to be a permissible interpretation of statute, and upholding
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that fear is very unlikely to be realized, at least in the foreseeable
future. In the half century since the IRS adopted the Bob Jones rule,
the agency has never extended it beyond race in an attempt to strip
tax-exempt status from schools that discriminate on other grounds
frequently covered by civil rights laws, such as sex.33 Moreover,
after the Supreme Court recognized the right of same-sex couples
to marry in Obergefell v. Hodges,34 the Obama Administration’s IRS
Commissioner made clear that the agency did not interpret the
decision as supporting an extension of the Bob Jones rule to schools
that prohibit same-sex relationships.35 Indeed, even if the IRS tried
to extend the rule, it is far from clear that the Supreme Court would
find the extension to be statutorily authorized.36 Nonetheless, given

its application to a religious university that prohibited its students from engaging in
interracial marriage and dating); Brief Amicus Curiae of United States Conference of
Catholic Bishops in Support of Respondents and Supporting Affirmance at 26, Obergefell v.
Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574), 2015 WL 1519042 ( “[I]f
the Court construes the Constitution to require government affirmation of same-sex
relationships as marriage, it would seem a short step to requiring such affirmation of private
actors as a condition of their . . . being eligible for tax exemption.”); Roger Severino, Or for
Poorer? How Same-Sex Marriage Threatens Religious Liberty, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 939, 973
(2007) (“Religious institutions that refuse to recognize same-sex marriages risk losing their
traditional tax-exempt status.”).
33. See Koppelman, Purposes of Antidiscrimination Law, supra note 5, at 624 n.19
(making this same observation). Just as conservatives are warning today that recognition of
LGBTQ equality might lead to an extension of the Bob Jones rule, Justice Scalia previously
offered a similar warning in the context of gender equality. See United States v. Virginia, 518
U.S. 515, 598 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Bob Jones and warning that “it is certainly
not beyond the Court that rendered today’s decision to hold that a donation to a single-sex
college should be deemed contrary to public policy and therefore not deductible”). Nearly a
quarter century later, the Bob Jones rule remains limited to race, and the IRS has made no
move to expand it.
34. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
35. See Letter from John A. Koskinen, Comm’r of Internal Revenue, to E. Scott Pruitt,
Att’y Gen. of Okla. (July 30, 2015), https://perma.cc/M6SR-UF4Q (“The IRS does not view
Obergefell as having changed the law applicable to section 501(c)(3) determinations or
examinations.”); Senator Mike Lee, IRS Commits to Not Target Religious Institutions, YOUTUBE
(July 29, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vvNrv_AfIq8 (video of the IRS
Commissioner committing, in response to a question from Sen. Lee, that he would not
attempt to remove tax exemptions from religious colleges that oppose same-sex marriage).
36. See Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 598–602 (emphasizing that “determinations of
whether given activities so violate public policy that the entities involved cannot be deemed
to provide a public benefit worthy of ‘charitable’ status . . . should be made only where there
is no doubt that the organization’s activities violate fundamental public policy,” and further
relying on “an unusually strong case of legislative acquiescence in” the Bob Jones rule,
including subsequent congressional enactment of a complementary provision stripping tax
exemptions from social clubs that discriminate on the basis of race).
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the continuing fears among some religious colleges that the IRS will
attempt to extend the Bob Jones rule,37 one possible compromise
LGBTQ-rights advocates might consider to facilitate enactment of
the Equality Act—a measure that would amend federal civil rights
laws to add explicit protections against discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation and gender identity38—would be to include a
provision that denies the IRS authority to extend the Bob Jones rule
beyond race.
Indeed, a recently proposed alternative to the Equality Act, the
Fairness for All Act (FFA),39 introduced by Representative Chris
Stewart (R-UT),40 includes precisely such a provision.41 The FFA
also includes several other provisions that would provide religious

37. See, e.g., Brief for Amici Curiae Council for Christian Colleges & Universities et al.
in Support of the Employers at 8, Bostock v. Clayton Cty., Nos. 17-1618, 17-1623, 18-107 (U.S.
Aug. 23, 2019), 2019 WL 4013298 (expressing concern that an “institution’s sincere religious
opposition to same-sex marriage could raise the question whether the IRS can deny or revoke
a religious university’s tax-exempt status” if the Supreme Court interprets federal
antidiscrimination law as prohibiting sexual-orientation discrimination).
38. H.R. 5, 116th Cong. (2019). The Equality Act passed the Democratic-controlled
House of Representatives on May 17, 2019, see All Actions H.R.5 – 116th Congress (2019-2020),
CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/5/all-actions,
but is unlikely to be taken up in its current form in the Republican-controlled Senate. See
Matthew Brown, Why Utah Congressman Ben McAdams Says He’s ‘Uniquely Situated’ to Bridge
Equality Act, Religious Liberties, DESERET NEWS (Sept. 7, 2019), https://www.deseret.
com/utah/2019/9/7/20849448/utah-ben-mcadams-equality-act-religious-freedom-lgbtqnondiscrimination-student-housing (reporting on comments from a House supporter of the
Equality Act acknowledging that the bill would need “refining” in order to move in the
Senate). Even if Senate Democrats were to win a majority in the 2020 election, absent a repeal
of the legislative filibuster, passage of the Equality Act in the 117th Congress would likely
require compromise on additional religious accommodations.
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731
(2020), which held that sexual-orientation discrimination and gender-identity discrimination
both constitute unlawful sex discrimination for purposes of federal employment law, does
not provide all the protection sought by the Equality Act. For example, the Bostock decision
has no impact on federal public accommodations law, which does not prohibit sex
discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2018) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of “race,
color, religion, or national origin”).
39. H.R. 5331, 116th Cong. (2019).
40. See Thomas Burr, Rep. Chris Stewart Pitches LGBTQ Rights Bill with Religious
Exemptions, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Dec. 6, 2019), https://www.sltrib.com/news/politics/2019/
12/06/rep-chris-stewart-pitches/ (“In the current debate between protecting rights of the
gay community and those of religious groups, Rep. Chris Stewart thinks he’s found a
common-ground consensus that comes as close as possible to closing the gap.”).
41. H.R. 5331 § 8.
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nonprofits with exemptions from antidiscrimination requirements.42
If I were a legislator considering whether any of these proposed
exemptions might be acceptable as part of a larger compromise, I
would steer clear of exemptions that would uniquely allow
discrimination against gay and lesbian individuals, but be open to
considering those that have parallels in current law.43 Following
this approach, I would be more inclined to consider the exemption
for religious schools in Section 3 of the FFA (federal funding),44
which parallels an existing exemption allowing such schools to
discriminate on the basis of sex,45 than I would be to consider the
exemption in Section 4 of the FFA (employment),46 which would
allow religious nonprofits to discriminate in non-ministerial hiring
and firing on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity,
even though they have long been prohibited from doing so on the
basis of sex. 47 Other people will undoubtedly have different
instincts about the specific exemptions proposed in the FFA, but
42. See, e.g., id. § 3 (generally prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation and gender identity by entities receiving federal funding, but including an
exemption providing that a “religious educational institution or daycare center may enforce
with reasonable consistency written religious standards in its admission criteria, educational
programs, student retention policies, or residential life policy”); id. § 4 (generally prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity in employment but
exempting religious nonprofits).
43. See Carlos A. Ball, Against LGBT Exceptionalism in Religious Exemptions from
Antidiscrimination Obligations, 31 J. C.R. & ECON. DEV. 233, 242 (2018) (arguing “in favor of
treating religious exemptions from sexual orientation antidiscrimination obligations in
generally similar ways as our country’s laws have treated religious exemptions in the context
of race and gender antidiscrimination obligations”); Nelson Tebbe, Religion and Marriage
Equality Statutes, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 25, 29 (2015) (“[R]eligion exemptions in [same-sex]
marriage equality laws receive justificatory support when they cohere with religion
accommodations in [existing] antidiscrimination laws . . . .”).
44. See supra note 42.
45. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(3) (2018) (providing an exemption in Title IX for “an
educational institution which is controlled by a religious organization if the application of
this subsection would not be consistent with the religious tenets of such organization”).
46. See supra note 42.
47. See Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1166–
67 (4th Cir. 1985) (“While the language of [the existing exemption] makes clear that religious
institutions may base relevant hiring decisions upon religious preferences, Title VII does not
confer upon religious organizations a license to make those same decisions on the basis of
race, sex, or national origin.”). The FFA makes clear that it is only proposing an exemption
for sexual-orientation and gender-identity discrimination, not other types of sex
discrimination. See H.R. 5331 § 4 (“This provision shall not otherwise affect claims of sex
discrimination, and nothing in this provision shall prevent a person, regardless of sexual
orientation or gender identity, from bringing a claim of sex discrimination.”).
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the important point is this: to the extent they are limited to
religious nonprofits, such proposals can at least make a colorable
claim to fall within the American tradition of reasonably accommodating religion.48
But the drafters of the FFA, like Koppelman in his lecture, go
one large step further: they urge the exemption of for-profit business
owners who object to the requirements of civil rights laws.49 The
principal problem with taking this extraordinary step is not simply,
as Koppelman’s lecture implies, that it would treat sexualorientation discrimination differently than race discrimination.
Rather, it is that it would treat sexual-orientation discrimination
differently from the way state public accommodations laws treat all
other types of covered discrimination.
For example, all forty-five states that prohibit race discrimination
by businesses open to the general public also prohibit religious
discrimination by such establishments,50 and scholars who argue
against permitting refusals of service to same-sex couples have
routinely analogized to the prospect of allowing refusals of service
to interfaith couples or politically disfavored religious minorities.51
48. See Ball, supra note 43, at 242 (examining “the ways in which American
antidiscrimination law, before the advent of same-sex marriage, sought to accommodate
religious dissent while pursuing equality objectives,” and observing that “exemptions have
been limited to nonprofit religious organizations”). See generally Koppelman, Misleading
Racism Analogy, supra note 3, at 5 (“It is a long-settled custom in the United States to
accommodate religious (and lately also nonreligious) conscientious objectors when this can
be done without undermining the law’s purposes.”).
49. See H.R. 5331 § 2 (generally prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation and gender identity in places of public accommodation, but exempting “any
store, shopping center, or online retailer or provider of online services” with less than fifteen
employees). Although not explicitly framed as a religious exemption, and although drafted
in a manner that would permit more types of discrimination than religious refusals of
wedding services to same-sex couples, the drafters of the FFA have made clear that it is
aimed at protecting such refusals. See Frequently Asked Questions about Fairness For All,
ALLIANCE FOR LASTING LIBERTY, https://fairnessforall.org/faq/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2020)
(discussing the provision under the heading, “How does this address wedding vendors?”).
50. See Elizabeth Sepper, The Role of Religion in State Public Accommodations Laws, 60 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 631, 638 & nn.19–20 (2016). Sepper reports forty-six states in this category, but
after her article was published, the public accommodations law in one of those states—which
had only been recently enacted as part of an effort to preempt broader local ordinances and
ban transgender individuals from using bathrooms that matched their gender identity—was
repealed in relevant part. See Carcaño v. Cooper, 350 F. Supp. 3d 388, 398–401 (M.D.N.C.
2018) (discussing the legislative history of North Carolina’s H.B. 2 and its repeal).
51. See, e.g., Brief of Church-State Scholars as Amici Curiae at 24, in Masterpiece
Cakeshop, Ltd., v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (interfaith couples);
Public Accommodation Law Scholars Brief, supra note 29, at 31 (Muslims); Mary Anne Case,
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Likewise, forty-four states prohibit sex discrimination by businesses
against customers,52 and scholars have analogized to the prospect
of allowing discrimination by business owners who have a sincere
religious belief that “women have a duty to stay home and raise
children.”53 Finally, eighteen states prohibit marital-status discrimination in places of public accommodation,54 and scholars have
analogized to the prospect of allowing wedding vendors to refuse
service to divorced people who are remarrying given that “the New
Testament quotes Jesus explicitly condemning divorce and
remarriage as adultery, and . . . such remarriages violate the current
teachings of the largest Christian denomination in America.”55
Scholars who resist proposals that would allow commercial
discrimination against same-sex couples do also draw upon the
race analogy, but they are doing so in a context where (unlike in the
nonprofit tax-exemption context discussed above) race is already
treated as an exemplar for other types of discrimination.56 And
these scholars do not typically claim that sexual-orientation
discrimination is in all respects comparable to race discrimination:
[T]he singular place of racial discrimination in American
history—which also includes the stain of Jim Crow laws and the
“separate but equal” doctrine—cannot and should not be denied.
But it is far from clear that the exceptional nature of the nation’s
struggle for racial equality should lead courts to treat race as
occupying a sui generis constitutional category into which entry is
Why “Live-and-Let-Live” Is Not a Viable Solution to the Difficult Problems of Religious
Accommodation in the Age of Sexual Civil Rights, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 463, 492 (2015) (interfaith
couples); James M. Oleske, Jr., Free Exercise (Dis)Honesty, 2019 WISC. L. REV. 689, 736, 736–38
(Muslims and interfaith couples); Sepper, supra note 50, at 661 (interfaith couples).
52. Sepper, supra note 50, at 638 (noting that South Carolina is the one state that
prohibits discrimination on the basis of race and religion, but not sex).
53. Brief of First Amendment Scholars as Amici Curiae at 30, Masterpiece Cakeshop,
Ltd., v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018). See also Oleske, supra note 51, at
737 (positing the hypothetical case of a “bank that refuses to issue checks to married women
in their name alone based on a religious belief that men are the head of married households”).
54. Sepper, supra note 50, at 638–39.
55. James M. Oleske, Jr., The Evolution of Accommodation: Comparing the Unequal
Treatment of Religious Objections to Interracial and Same-Sex Marriages, 50 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 99, 144 (2015); see also Church-State Scholars Brief, supra note 51, at 24; Case, supra note
51, at 492.
56. See generally Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 624 (1984) (describing how states
initially “adopted statutes prohibiting racial discrimination in public accommodations” in
the late 1800s and later “broadened the scope” of those statutes “with respect to the groups
against whom discrimination is forbidden”).
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barred for all other victims of discrimination. The more fitting
approach might well be to honor that original struggle for civil
rights by giving full force to its lessons in other relevant areas.57

State civil rights laws have long done precisely that—they have
taken the lessons learned from the fight against race discrimination,
including the importance of preventing the profound indignity of
being turned away by businesses otherwise open to members of the
general public, and extended them to other types of discrimination
that have similar effects.58 And, as the Supreme Court recently made
clear, “[i]t is unexceptional that [state] law can protect gay persons,
just as it can protect other classes of individuals, in acquiring whatever
products and services they choose on the same terms and
conditions as are offered to other members of the public.”59
Scholars who have argued against allowing business owners to
refuse service to same-sex couples for religious reasons have broadly

57. Oleske, supra note 55, at 120–21. See also Michael Kent Curtis, A Unique Religious
Exemption from Antidiscrimination Laws in the Case of Gays? Putting the Call for Exemptions for
Those Who Discriminate Against Married or Marrying Gays in Context, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
173, 185–86 (2012) (“The analogy to race or gender (as with all analogies) is not perfect.”);
Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Agora, Dignity, and Discrimination: On the Constitutional
Shortcomings of “Conscience” Laws That Promote Inequality in the Public Marketplace, 20 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 1221, 1250 n.113 (2017) (“To be sure, race in the United States has a particularly
fraught history.”); Linda C. McClain, Religious and Political Virtues and Values in Congruence
or Conflict?: On Smith, Bob Jones University, and Christian Legal Society, 32 CARDOZO L. REV.
1959, 2007 (2011) (“[A]nalogies need not be perfect in order to be persuasive, or at least
instructive. It is possible to appeal to the dignitary harms of discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation, without denying the unique harms perpetuated by public and private
race discrimination.”).
58. See Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 625 (upholding application of Minnesota’s prohibition of
sex discrimination and explaining that the “stigmatizing injury” of being denied “equal
access to public establishments . . . is surely felt as strongly by persons suffering
discrimination on the basis of their sex as by those treated differently because of their race”);
cf. Lee v. Ashers Baking Co. Ltd. [2018] UKSC 49 at [35] (appeal taken from N. Ir.) (U.K.)
(recognizing that “[i]t is deeply humiliating, and an affront to human dignity, to deny
someone a service because of that person’s race, gender, disability, sexual orientation or
any of the other . . . personal characteristics” which “are now protected by the law” in the
United Kingdom).
59. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1728
(2018) (emphasis added); see Douglas NeJaime & Reva Siegel, Religious Exemptions and
Antidiscrimination Law in Masterpiece Cakeshop, 128 YALE L.J. FORUM 201, 208 (2018)
(“Masterpiece Cakeshop treats lesbian and gay individuals as full members of the national
community deserving of equal protection from discrimination. The Court accomplishes this
by analyzing the case as presenting an ordinary question of public accommodations law. . . .
The Court, then, does not endorse a two-tiered system of antidiscrimination law in which
some groups get full protection and others get less.”).
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analogized to how the law treats “other classes of individuals,” not
just racial minorities.60 They have relied on the general principle,
not limited to race, that “businesses that choose to open their doors
to the public have an obligation to provide equal services” to
members of “disfavored groups.”61
Koppelman’s lecture does not mention, never mind attempt to
engage, these prevailing arguments among academics who oppose
exemptions for wedding vendors. Instead, he portrays opposition
to such exemptions as being almost entirely grounded in a
moral conviction that the vendors are as bad as “evil” racists.62
And without acknowledging the salient fact that state public
accommodations laws have never extended religious exemptions to
60. See supra notes 51, 53, and 55 (collecting articles and briefs); see also Ball, supra note
43, at 238 (“[H]ow the nation’s laws have accommodated religious freedom in the pursuit of
racial and gender equality has worked well for all sides.” (emphasis added)); Krotoszynski,
supra note 57, at 1223 n.3 (“There is no good reason to view discrimination based on sexual
orientation or transgender status as any less socially harmful than denials on account of sex,
religion, or race.”) (emphasis added); Mark Strasser, Masterpiece of Misdirection?, 76 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 963, 976 (2019) (“Individuals who disapprove of a variety of kinds of families or
groups (whether defined in terms of sex, race, religion, national origin, or some other
category) might analogously suggest that their promotion of those families/groups in a
variety of contexts would be a violation of conscience.” (emphasis added)); Tebbe, supra note
43, at 42 (“[E]ven if the race analogy is complicated, comparison to prohibitions on
differentiation based on marital status and religion itself point to the same result.”).
61. Public Accommodation Law Scholars Brief, supra note 29, at 3–4. See generally
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982) (“When followers of a particular sect enter into
commercial activity as a matter of choice, the limits they accept on their own conduct as a
matter of conscience and faith are not to be superimposed on the statutory schemes which
are binding on others in that activity.”); Chai R. Feldblum, Moral Conflict and Liberty: Gay
Rights and Religion, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 61, 119–20 (2006) (“Once individuals choose to enter
the stream of economic commerce by opening commercial establishments, I believe it is
legitimate to require that they play by certain rules.”); NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 59, at 208
(noting with approval that the Masterpiece Cakeshop Court “invokes the ‘general rule’ that
religious objections ‘do not allow business owners and other actors in the economy and in
society to deny protected persons equal access to goods and services under a neutral and
generally applicable public accommodations law.’”).
62. See Koppelman, Misleading Racism Analogy, supra note 3, at 3 (“A common response
to proposals [to exempt wedding vendors] is that conservative condemnation of gay sex and
marriage is as evil as racism, and those who hold that view should likewise be disqualified
from religious accommodations.”); id (“The most important mistake that the analogy elicits
is the notion that everyone who endorses the traditional religious condemnation of
homosexuality is evil.”); id. at 7 (“What, precisely, does it mean to say that objections to
homosexual conduct are the moral equivalent of racism?”); id. at 9 (“This brings us to a third
analogy, the one that is probably doing most of the work. Racists are evil!”); id. at 14
(describing as a “settled” narrative on the “left” the view that “because you believe horrible
things, it follows that you are horrible people”); id. at 15 (“The racism analogy is malign and
destructive insofar as it leads Americans to regard their fellow citizens as hateful demons.”).
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business owners,63 Koppelman asserts that “labeling and vilification are the most influential reason for refusing any religious
exemption from antidiscrimination law” for wedding vendors.64
He also claims, citing just one anecdote that does not actually seem
to support his claim, that “[t]here is a growing consensus on the left
that heterosexism is as evil as racism.” 65 In making these
arguments, Koppelman appears to be conflating two very different
things: (1) the drawing of legal analogies between the law’s
treatment of race discrimination and other types of discrimination,
including sexual-orientation discrimination, and (2) an insistence
on treating race discrimination and sexual-orientation discrimination
as morally and sociologically equivalent in all respects. Number 1 is
quite common in the scholarship. Number 2 is not.
Indeed, as far as I am aware, none the articles and briefs I have
cited above,66 which represent the views of more than thirty law
professors who oppose exemptions for wedding vendors, has made
the argument Koppelman’s lecture is aimed at knocking down.
That said, I have seen the argument in two places. First, I have seen
it attributed to “the Left” by a prominent opponent of LGBTQ

63. See Public Accommodation Law Scholars Brief, supra note 29, at 34 (“No state
public accommodation law exempts commercial businesses.”); Illinois Letter, supra note 6, at
4 (“Businesses in the commercial marketplace . . . cannot discriminate simply because
business owners sincerely believe that their discrimination is justified.”); see also Oleske,
supra note 55, at 145–46 (“[N]o state has ever exempted commercial business owners from
the obligation to provide equal services for interracial marriages, interfaith marriages, or
marriages involving divorced individuals—even though major religious traditions in
America have opposed each type of marriage.”).
64. Koppelman, Misleading Racism Analogy, supra note 3, at 4; see id. at 3 (identifying
several racism analogies and claiming they “are the ones that are usually invoked to block
any accommodation”).
65. Id. at 5. The example Koppelman cites involves a pastor who was initially invited
to give the invocation at President Obama’s second inaugural, but who withdrew after
controversy erupted over a sermon in which he had described the gay rights movement as
“a very powerful and aggressive moment,” and warned that it “is not a benevolent
movement, it is a movement to seize by any means necessary the feeling and the mood of
the day, to the point where the homosexual lifestyle becomes accepted as a norm in our
society and is given full standing as any other lifestyle.” Stephanie Condon, Pastor Drops Out
of Inauguration over Anti-Gay Sermon, CBS NEWS (Jan 10, 2013), https://www.cbsnews.com/
news/pastor-drops-out-of-inauguration-over-anti-gay-sermon/. Unless Koppelman thinks
comparable comments about the women’s rights movement or religious minorities would
not generate similar controversy, and that only comments about race and sexual orientation
would, it is unclear how this anecdote supports his claim.
66. See supra notes 51, 53, 55, 60, 61, 63.
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rights.67 Second, I have seen it in one law review article68—an article
that also happened to offer “angry” criticism of Koppelman that he
addresses at length in his lecture.69 Koppelman’s decision to ignore
the arguments made by the vast majority of law professors in the
no-exemptions-for-wedding-vendors camp, while focusing
exclusively on an argument made by a single law professor in that
camp, brings to mind the following admonition: “The logic is
depressingly familiar: Some members of group X [believe Y],
therefore every member of X [believes Y].”70
***
The reason public accommodations laws prohibit discrimination
against customers is not to ensure punishment of “evil” business
owners. The reason is to ensure that customers do not face the
indignity of being treated as second-class citizens in the public
marketplace. Thus, the relevant analogy when considering
exemptions for wedding vendors who oppose same-sex marriage
is not the one between “heterosexist” and “racist” views. Rather, the
relevant analogy is to exemptions for business practices that would
deny customers full and equal service on the basis of race, religion,
sex, or marital status. Because Professor Koppelman misapprehends
this, his lecture—which focuses on unpacking what “it mean[s] to
say that objections to homosexual conduct are the moral equivalent
of racism”71—ultimately amounts to one long non-sequitur. It is an
immensely thought-provoking non-sequitur,72 but it does not
67. See Ryan T. Anderson, Will Marriage Dissidents Be Treated as Bigots or Pro-Lifers?,
THEFEDERALIST (July 14, 2015), https://thefederalist.com/2015/07/14/will-marriagedissidents-treated-bigots-pro-lifers/ (“For years, the Left’s refrain has been that people who
oppose same-sex marriage are just like people who opposed interracial marriage—and that
the law should treat them as it treats racists.”).
68. Shannon Gilreath & Arley Ward, Same-Sex Marriage, Religious Accommodation, and
the Race Analogy, 41 VT. L. REV. 237, 246 (2016) (Gilreath: “I will not mince words: the
argument that anti-gay discrimination is somehow qualitatively different from anti-black
discrimination is bunk. It is a convenient smoke screen enabling bigots to mask their true
animus.”).
69. Koppelman, Misleading Racism Analogy, supra note 3, at 21–23.
70. Id. at 22. On a side note, Koppelman’s attribution of this form of reasoning to
Gilreath and Ward does not strike me as supported by either the passage he quotes from
their article or the longer discussion within which it is found.
71. Id. at 7.
72. For example, Koppelman’s analogizing of what he describes as the “otherwise
decent people” who (1) resisted full racial integration in the Civil Rights Era and (2) resist
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provide a convincing answer to the question posed at the beginning
of the lecture: “Should religious people who conscientiously object
to facilitating same-sex weddings, and who therefore decline to
provide cakes, photography, or other services, be exempted from
antidiscrimination laws?” Koppelman got the answer to that question
correct, and for the right reasons, in 2013.73 The answer is no.
If the goal is to achieve principled compromise in the gayrights/religious-liberty debate—and Koppelman is correct that
“[m]any compromises are possible”—the focus going forward
should instead be on negotiating over accommodations for
nonprofit religious organizations. 74 That negotiation would
undoubtedly benefit from Koppelman’s engagement given his
extensive and insightful commentary in the past on both gay rights
and religious liberty.75 In the meantime, this Response respectfully
urges Professor Koppelman to reconsider his current position on
the wedding-vendor cases, which involve claims for unprecedented
exemptions that would upend a long-settled norm: “Businesses
in the commercial marketplace . . . cannot discriminate simply
because business owners sincerely believe that their discrimination
is justified.”76
full equality for LGBTQ people today, and his challenging of the “bad history” offered by
those who would dismiss comparisons between the two, id. at 10–11, warrants further
engagement by proponents of that history. Cf. Oleske, supra note 55, at 108-09 (“Another
striking similarity between the debates over same-sex marriage and interracial marriage is
that just as the 2000s saw politicians who otherwise supported gay rights invoke religion to
draw the line at same-sex marriage, the 1960s saw a similar phenomenon, with no less a
champion of integration than former President Harry Truman openly expressing his religious
opposition to interracial marriage.”). On a related note, Koppelman’s treatment of how the
term “bigotry” has been deployed and resisted in the current debate, juxtaposed with his
own use of the terms “destructive,” “repugnant,” “deplorable,” and “invincibly ignorant,”
Koppelman, Misleading Racism Analogy, supra note 3, at 10, 16, 28, invites obvious questions,
the answers to which could make for an interesting sequel to Koppelman’s lecture.
73. See supra notes 6–9 and accompanying text.
74. See generally Richard W. Garnett, John D. Inazu & Michael W. McConnell, How to
Protect Endangered Religious Groups You Admire, CHRISTIANITY TODAY (August 4, 2015),
https://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2015/august-web-only/how-to-protect-endangeredreligious-groups-you-admire.html (“We think the best approach is to tailor [a leading
congressional exemption proposal] to the core area of concern: religious nonprofits. That
focus would serve the cause of religious freedom by making it more likely that this important
legislation can move forward.”).
75. See Koppelman, Misleading Racism Analogy, supra note 3, at 30 n.113 (citing prior
scholarship on gay rights); supra notes 1–12 (citing prior scholarship on religious liberty and
gay rights).
76. Illinois Letter, supra note 6, at 4.
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